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The Epistemological Concepts of Umāsvāti: 193 definition of naya as follows — 3748 EsfeRUTH'-Finally, resorting to the verdict of experience in the form ‘pramiņomi' and ‘nayāmi', he directs that the characteristic objectness distinguishing ‘pramāņa' and 'naya' must be accepted. (ufwulf नयामीत्यनुभवसाक्षिको विषयताविशेषः प्रमाणनयभेदकोऽवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्य इति दिक्।'
While explaining the sūtra pertaining to the classification of jnanati (मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्यायकेवलानि ज्ञानम्), Yasovijaya brings about the compatibility of the usage of ‘kevalāni' and 'jñānam' in plural number and singular number respectively as follows— '7 पञ्चभिः सम्भूयैकं ज्ञानमवग्रहादिचतुर्भिरिव भवतीति सूचनाय केवलानीति बहुवचनं, ज्ञानमित्यत्रैकवचनं तु प्रतिज्ञानुरूपत्वात् प्रतिवचनस्य।'11
The learned author of the sub-commentary entitled 'Gūdhārthadīpikā'on the 'vivarana' of Yaśovijaya has presented an elaborate explanation of this portion taking recourse to the terse technical terms of navya-nyāya. Removing the lacuna in the bhāsya on the sūtra in question, he has put forth specific definitions of the five cognitions precisely as follows:
1. gfselfis42114RURİ FIR Hfag11741 2. POSTURI FIR SC516741 3. hafa haftan41 4. भावमनःपर्यायमात्रसाक्षात्कारि मनःपर्यायज्ञानम्। 5. THIRheafa hafaqej at analar |
Explaining the sūtra —*764410*12 he has rightly observed in support of the scholiast Umāsvāti that the state of organ of valid cognition (pramāṇatva) and the number two both are enjoined in the sūtra. According to him, all other pramāṇas accepted by the opponents are included under these two provided they are really organs of valid cognition. He further opines that of both the direct and indirect cognitions, the ‘sākāra' cognition (i.e., devoid of doubt, error etc.) alone deserves to be designated as pramāņa. It is worthmentioning here that in the exposition of the sūtra (1/10) he has also discussed the view of the Jaina
