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Umāsvāti on Omniscience 119
present and future as its object. To denote this sense generally the word sarvajña is used in Jainism and other schools of Indian philosophy. However, in the Tattvärthasūtra the word sarvajña is never employed while the author uses the term kevalajñāna." The reason of this particular usage shall be discussed later.
Besides these explicit arguments, Umāsvāti also describes the unique nature of omniscience in an implicit manner. He says that among the five kinds of knowledge, the first three types, i.e. perception, scripture and clairvoyance, may contain wrong or false ones. This means that the remaining two types of knowledge, in which omniscience is included, are always right. The author mentions that the four types of knowledge can occur simultaneously in one and the same person. This again means that only the omniscience cannot take place with other kinds of knowledge in one and the same person because the omniscience recognizes, as we have seen above, all the substances and modes. From these facts it can be said that Umāsvāti realizes the epistemological speciality of omniscience.
Almost all Jaina philosophers admit that a soul (jīva) has a defining character called upayoga or consciousness. Though Umāsvāti refers to the fact that there are two sub-divisions of upayoga, i.e. the fundamental character of jīva, 10 he does not explain the details of them. Traditionally the Jaina philosophers maintain that in kevalin as well as in an ordinary person the upayoga has two aspects; jñāna and darśana. On the order of occurrence of these two in an omniscient person, the two sects, the Svetambara and the Digambara, have different opinions. The former maintains that the two take place one after another while the latter is of the opinion that the two occur simultaneously.11 Umāsvāti never exhibits his idea on this topic. He must have noticed the divergence between the two sects. Because of being a Digambara author, he and his predecessor Kundakunda clearly mentioned the simultaneous occurrence of the two while in the agamas the opposite theory is mentioned.12 We cannot