Page Text
________________
60
Faina-Farka-Bhāşa
un wit.
statement, to indicate that the quality is a qualification of a certain qualified object; otherwise, there would be an occasion for not stating even the cause which can be known only by the statement of the support, and as far as the condition of making known to the people of dull wit is concerned, it is the same in both the cases. Moreover, if the statement was not to be stated, it should not have been stated even in the beginning of the scriptures, whereas this is found stated even in the Buddhist scriptures, and if this is said to be stated in the scriptures for favouring others, its use would be equally justified in a debate for those who want victory, for making it known to the person of dull wit.
*48. It is said that only that where a statement is given from the scriptures of the opponent to prove a thing, is the inference for others e. g. the inference of the Sānkhya that 'the intelligence is unconscious because it is created like the pitcher'. In this inference of the Sānkhya, the quality of being produced is not accepted by the Sānkhyas themselves, in the intelligence, so only here, it is a case of inference for others; this is not correct; because there is a difference of opinion regarding the validity of the scriptures between the two opponents, otherwise, the probandum would be proved by that (scripture) alone. And even if we accept the scripture before examining it, it would be obstructed at the time of examination. If it is so, how you yourself state this to others "which is absolutely one, cannot be connected with many as generality" ? True; but here we do not use it as a deciding factor of the object but rather as a means to establish that where one quality is there, another quality will also have to be accepted, because the deciding factor is the original cause which perverts this inference (namely, generality is multiformed because it is connected with many and that which is connected with many is multiformed), and because it is justifiable to use this inference as an aid to the original cause as by the removal of that which is coexistent with manifoldness, it (manifoldness)is also removed. And as regards the inference that 'the intelligence is unconscious etc.' it is not justifiable to use it, because we do not place any proof which obstructs the opponent
| SR No. | 022374 |
| Book Title | Jaina Tarka Bhasha |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Dayanand Bhargava |
| Publisher | Motilal Barasidas Pvt Ltd |
| Publication Year | 1973 |
| Total Pages | 198 |
| Language | English, Sanskrit |
| Classification | Book_English |
| File Size | 16 MB |