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THE ESSENCE OF JAINA SCRIPTURES
existence of substance-is the own nature.
And, as of gold, which is not perceived in respect of substance or place or time or being apart from origination, annihilation and stability of ring, bracelet, yellowness, etc., and which is associated with an actualization actualized by origination, annihilation and stability of ring, bracelet, yellowness, etc., associated with an actualization, actualized by origination, annihilation and stability of ring, bracelet, yellowness, etc. associated with a process proceeding in company with a manifestation of gold as their agent, instrument and seat—the existence realized by these as the fundamental means is the self-nature: so of substance, which is not perceived in respect of substance or space or time or being apart from origination, annihilation and stability—and which is associated with an actualization actualized by origination, annihilation and stability, associated with a process proceeding in company with a manifestation of substance, as their agent, instrument and seat—the existence actualized by these as the fundamental means is the self-nature."
Now he states the expression “it is” for existence-of-common-nature (sadrashya-astitva):
II.5. The Jina (the worthy Lord), when he preached the dharma, declared that one, common characteristic, “to be an existent," belongs here to all things with their manifold characterizations. (97)
Here in all substances, although (1) characterized by a proper existence of their own, (2) proceeding with a developed manifoldness exclusive of other substances and (3) serving as specific characteristic drawing the boundaries between substances, we must recognize an "existence” of common nature, one, (1) a common characteristic, omnipresent, termed “existence,” (2) proceeding with sublation of the developed manifoldness and (3) breaking through the border-line drawn between substances.
So the expression “it is” and our discrimination expressed by “it is” concern all objects. If this were not so, then one thing should be called “existent,” another thing “not-existent,” again another thing “existent-and-not-existent,” and again another thing “impossible to describe” (i.e. the syad-vada would with one only of its members prevail for each object). This now is contradicted and cannot be realized, as for instance in the case of trees.
As in the case of many manifold trees the manifoldness, founded