Sudha Sagar Hindi English Jaina Dictionary

SR No.: 016127
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Rameshchandra Jain
Publisher: Gyansagar Vagarth Vimarsh Kendra Byavar
Publication Year: 1999
Total Pages: 404
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Dictionary & Dictionary
File Size: 38 MB

Page 211

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is in certain spheres it operates and in certain others it does not. प्रत्यक्ष के दो भेद - Akalaika, following his predecessors, divides perception into twocategories :empirical (Hilafet) and transcendental (you). The former requires the help of sense-organs and mind for its emergence, the latter does not. For, this latter is dircetly generating soul without the intervention of sense-organs and mind. The transcendental perception is again of threetypes - Avadhi Jmāna, Manah-paryāya Jhāna and Kevala-J Tā na. HiQGE URTET – Empirical per- ception Sense perception - sense - Organs are a condition of sense percep- tion. Aklanka observes that the cogni- tion which is generated by the senses and which is capable of avoiding the underisable and attaining the desirable (i.e. which enables one to avoid the undesirable and attain the desirable) is sense perception. At another place he defines sense-perception as a knowl- edge due to sense-organs and mind. The soul, the object etc. are here not mentioned as conditions of sense perception because they are not peculiar to sense perception. For this very reason it is possible to avoid, in the definition of sense-perception, the mention of mind as a condition of sense-perception. Akalanka has at times done even that. इन्द्रिय प्रत्यक्ष के भेद - According to Akalan ka and other Jaina logicians sense perception can be analysed into four stages - Avagraha, 'Tha' avaya and Dhārnā. These four stages are usually described as types of sense
perception. But it would be more appropriate to treat them as four stages of sense perception because this is what they turn out to be when psychologically analysed. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen from the fact that Akalan ka himself states that an earlier form develops into the next subsequent forms and that all of them are of the same essential nature.' Aklanaka defines avagraha as that determinate cognition of the distinctive nature of an object which follows in the wake of the indeterminate cognition of the pure existence of this object, an indeterminate cognition which in turn is consequent upon the contact of the sense organ with the object. On the contact of the sense organ with the object there arises the indeterminate cognition of pure existence (san-mā tra-darsana). This indeterminate cognition then develops into the determinate cognition of the object. This is called avagraha. Thā is defined by Akalanka as the striving for the knowledge of) a specific characteristic of the object cognised by avagraha. This Inā is different from doubt for the reason that it positively possesses the elementofascertainment, The definition of avāya given by him is as follows. Avāya means the ascertainment of the specific features of an object. In other words, avā ya is the determinate cognition of a specific characteristic of an object. It arises from the exclusion of the wrong and ascertainment of the right. Akalan ka defines Dhārna as the condition of recollection, a condition called Samskāra (trace). But this samskāra