Multidimensional Application of Anekantavada

SR No.: 014009
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sagarmal Jain, Shreeprakash Pandey, Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith
Publication Year: 1999
Total Pages: 552
Language: English, Hindi
Classification: Seminar & Articles
File Size: 9 MB

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Multi-dimensional Application of Anekāntavāda
It also possesses the attributes (guņas) called anvayi, which co-exist with substance (dravya) and modifications (paryāya) called vyatireki which succeed each other. Productivity and destructivity constitute the dynamic aspect of an entity and permanence in its enduring factor. This view is a blended form of the completely static view held by the Vedāntins and the completely dynamic view held by the Buddhists. Siddhasena says A person who refers exclusively to the general divorces is of its particulars; similarly, a person who talks of the particulars exclusively divorces them from their general
The Vedānta philosophy submits the nature of treatment of reality with three standpoints, viz. pārmārthika(ultimate), vyāvahărika (empirical), and prätibhâsika (apparent). The Buddhists assert the truth through two standpoints yiz, paramārtha satya(ultimate) and sarvịtisatya (conventional). The momentariness of the object (svalokşaņatā) is the first and its sāmānaya lakṣaṇa which is imaginary is the second one. Vedānta rejected the modes as unreal while the Buddhists rejected the substance as imaginary by accepting the reality of the modes. On the other hand, the Jaina logicians, both the views are correct to certain extent. From Dravyärthika standpoint the modes become secondary and from Paryāyārthika standpoint they become prominent. Thus the Anekāntavāda considers that both the views carry truth. Substance and their modes cannot abide without each other.
Every reality is non-existent from the standpoint of dissimilar particulars that are absolutely different from the things. Even among things that are similar, a thing exists, from Vyañjanaparyāya point of view and does not exist from Arthaparyāya point of view. A thing exists definitely from standpoint of its own particular and does not exist definitely from standpoint of the particulars of other things. From Vyañjanaparyāya standpoint, a thing exists (Sadrśyapratyaya) and from arthaparyāya standpoint it does not exist. The intrinsic nature of a substance is the source of existence while the extrinsic nature of a substance is the source of non-existence. The Anekāntavāda pointed out that affirmation without negation and negation without affirmation is never possible.
Anekāntavāda also provided the co-existence between permanent