Pushkarmuni Abhinandan Granth

SR No.: 012012
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Devendramuni, A D Batra, Shreechand Surana
Publisher: Rajasthankesari Adhyatmayogi Upadhyay Shree Pushkar Muni Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti
Publication Year: 1969
Total Pages: 1188
Language: Hindi, English
Classification: Smruti_Granth & Articles
File Size: 39 MB

Page 322

The Relativity of Naya In Jaina Logic २८१
6. As against the above standpoint which accepts identity in objects even though there is difference in their modes, the samabhiradhanaya takes account of the difference in objects when the modes vary; that is, it emphasises the literal meaning of words ignoring their identical derivated meanings. For example, the words Indra, Sakra and Purandara have the same derivative meanings, i.e. king of gods in heaven. But samabhiradhanaya overlooks the identity of meaning of the synonyms and it accepts difference in objects when the modes are different, and in this way it distinguishes one synonym from the other applying each word for its specific object in accordance with the etimological meaning of the word.
7. Lastly, the such-like or evambhutanaya is a special application of samabhirudhanaya and it restricts a word to one particular meaning, which emphasises one particular aspect of an object. For instance, the word 'gau' literally means a moving animal and so a moving cow should be designated by 'gau'. But if it is not moving, the animal should not be designated as 'gau', but by a different word. This standpoint takes a word in its strict etimological sense, which is applicable to an object "having practical efficiency at the present moment". If this principle is ignored, as the grammarian does, we fall into error called evambhutanayābhāsa.
Having discussed the important features of some of the nayas, we find that in each case the preceding naya has a greater extent and applicability than the succeeding ones. Thus for instance, the naigamanaya has the greatest extent, as it is concerned with both real (bhuva) and unreal (abhāva) things. Contrary to this samgrahanaya refers only to things that are real (bhava) and so it has lesser extent, although it has greater extent and applicability than vyavahāranaya which deals with only a part of the real, e.g., individual things existing in the past, the present and the future. Again, the latter has greater extent than rjusutranaya which is concerned only with the present modes of individual things. In this way each preceding naya has greater extent than the succeeding ones.
The above classification and explanation of the nayas go to show that there are many ways of looking at things and consequently there are infinite number of nayas or points of view. They are, of course, the partial views regarding things and are relative to the different aspects of them. All affirmations whether affirmative or negative are conditioned to time, place and the various circumstances, "Infinite number of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view." It is, therefore, suggested by the Jaina logicians that each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase 'syat' by certain point, which will ensure their correctness and relativity of truth.
IV
Having gone through the chief ways of affirmations called nayas, which at one time emphasise the substantial character of things in which qualities and modes remain merged and at the next moment the modal aspect where qualities and modes alone remain predominant, we find that they have a great practical value. And this centres round the truth that since we human beings cannot transcend our limitations regarding the knowledge of things we, of necessity, must approach reality with a specific point of view or intent, which "works, of course, by way of thing or by way of word, because there is no other course." And this intent, which indirectly also exposes our inability to cognise things in their entirety, may be termed as pragmatic. It is pragmatic firstly because it enables men to cognise the nature of things, at least from a particular point of view, which may be useful to their purpose. Again, it is pragmatic because this intent to cognise things from a specific point of view has a unique compromising or unifying effect upon the different opposite and contrary view-points, and this may be considered as most useful and commendable for the well-being of men in general.
In this connection, it may further be mentioned that the Jainas' principle of 'naya', even to-day in some form or the other, is being practised by some eminent contemporary western thinkers too. For the meaning or importance in our thoughts of objects and things, according to some of them, rests mainly upon the "effects of a practical kind the object may involve-what