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CHAFTER XVI
UPAMĀNA AS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE
OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMANA)
1. Can upamāna gue us any valid knowledge ?
With regard to the Nyāya view of upamāna it has been urged by the Cārvākas that it cannot give us any true knowledge about the denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyāyikas. In it we are to know the objects denoted by a word from their similarity or dissimlarity to certain wellknown things or from their peculiarities. But mere resemblance or difference without any universal relation cannot be the ground of a certain conclusion In the stock example of sādharinya-upamāna, we are to know that a certain animal must be a gavaya because it is similar to the cow. If the similarity between thu two be perfect, then they become identical with each other Hence on the ground of such perfect similarity it is as much true to say that the animal is a cow as to say that it is a garaya II, on the other hand, the similanty be semi-perfect or considerable, then the word gavaya may be taken to denote buffaloes in so far as they are considerably similar to the cow If, again, the similarity be imperfect or slight, there is nothing to prevent the application of the name garaya to cats and dogs in so far at least as they are animals like the cow Similarly, any description of a class of things in terms of then dissimilarity to certain well-known things or in those of their peculiarities does not always help us to recognise them as such-and-such, or know them as denoted by this or that word. This shows
