Nyaya Theory of Knowledge

SR No.: 011115
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: S C Chateerjee
Publisher: University of Calcutta
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 440
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 38 MB

Page 113

94
NYAYA TA EO, Y OF KNOWLEDGE
without the attainment of success. Hence of the attainment of success presiipposes kuowledge of validity, there cannot be any contention at all The contending will can have no logical justification There is, therefore, no necessity of the knowledge of valıdıty either for activity as such or for successful activity. The latter does not presuppose the former Hence there is no fallacy of circular reasoning involved in the view that successful activity is the test of the truth of knowledge
The third objection against the Nyāja view of extrinsic validity is that it ivolves the fallacy of argumentum ad infinitum (anarasthā). If the valıdıty of a knowledge is to be known from an external source, ie by means of some other knowledge, then we shall have to prove the validating knowledge on other external grounds, and so on ad infinitum. Thus we are to say that the validity of perception is known by inference, that of inference by comparison (upamāna), that of the last by testimony, and that of testimony by still other nethods of knowledge. Hence the methods of knowledge must be innumerable. It may be said that to prove the validity of knowledge we need not go beyond the four methods, but prove one ndividual perception or inference by another perception or inference. Even then we cannot avoid the difficulty of infinite regress What will happen is that within the circle of the four metl ods of the Nyāya, the process of validation of one knowledge by another will go on for ever. Thus the perception of water may be known to be valid by inference from successful activity or essential similiarity. But how are we to know the validity of the validating inference? It must be by some other perception or inference, and so on ad infinitum. To avoid this difficulty the Naiyāyikas cannot say that while the validity of the primary knowledge is established by the secondary, that of the latter is self-evident, and so requires no verification. If the truth of the secondary