Outlines of Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 011084
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Jain Mission Society Bangalore
Publication Year: 1954
Total Pages: 195
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 7 MB

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OUTLINES OF JAINA PHILOSOPHY
be realised by you by means of inference. Hence, it is not justifiable to believe that no pramāna can establish its existence. The karma is either good or bad. The good karma makes us experience happiness, whereas the bad karma misery.”'l
There is a kāyaṇa (cause) for experiencing happiness and misery, since it is a kārya (effect) as is the case with a sprout. It is no use arguing that since the karma is not pratyaksa to everybody, it should not exist. There is no such rule that what is pratyaksa to one, should be necessarily so to another. A lion is not pratyaksa to all beings. But on that account, it is not true to say that a lion does not exist. Therefore, the karma does exist, since it is directly perceived by an omniscient being.
Moreover, the karma is pratyaksa to the doubter, too, since he realises its kārya, as is the case with material atoms, which though not directly realisable, are pratyakşa, since their kārvas (effects) like a pitcher, etc., are directly perceived.
This point of cause and effect is further explained. Just as a sprout which is a karya, has a seed for it, so happiness and misery, which are well known to every individual, have a cause, because they are kāryas. And this cause is nothing but karma and so it exists. A question may be raised: A garland, sandal paste, a woman, and the like are the causes of happiness, whereas a serpent, poison, a thorn, etc., are those of misery. All these causes of happiness and misery are seen—are the objects of the sense of sight. So, why should we believe karma to be their cause—the karma which is not seen ? To admit a thing not seen in the place of one that is seen is not justifiable.
This question is out of place owing to tyabhicāra (irrelevancy). It is a matter of common experience that persons having the same means for enjoying happiness, do not get the same type of happiness. It is the same case with those who have the same or similar means to suffer misery. This difference in each case, cannot be without a cause which is not seen. This very unseen cause is karma.
Furthermore, just as the body in youth is preceded by a body in childhood, so is the body in childhood preceded by another body. The body which is prior to that in childhood is karma.2
1 l’ytti on Viseşāvaśyaka-bhāsya, I6II. : Visesāvasyaka-bhāsya, 1614.