Outlines of Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 011084
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Jain Mission Society Bangalore
Publication Year: 1954
Total Pages: 195
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 7 MB

Page 83

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To refute this conclusion of the Jaina, the Naiyayika urges in the course of his answer that the adṛṣṭa (karma) of our atman is supposed to act even at a distance and it cannot be there hanging in the air without an underlying substratum; consequently, our atman must be supposed to be existing even there. Since adṛṣṭa works everywhere, the underlying substance, viz., atman must also exist everywhere.
NATURE OF SOUL
The Jaina gives a counter argument. He denies that adṛṣṭa is acting there and everywhere. Things, according to him, have their own nature-a fact which is ultimate and does not admit of question or explanation-and that nature is not caused by adṛṣṭa. Fire burns because it has got the nature of burning. We cannot say that fire burns, because adṛṣṭa is there. It burns of itself.
Secondly, to say that the natures of the things are determined by adṛṣṭa is to leave no room for Gcd.
Thirdly, since they hold that atmans are many, if each of them is vibhu (all-pervasive) also, as they believe, what a wonderful clash and interpenetration of atmans would ensue? Moreover, each of them would enter the atman of God Himself, and each would thereby become a creator; for they believe that God is the creator of this universe.
It may be further urged: Unless an atman was vibhu, how could it draw to itself the particles of the body in which it has to dwell in the next life? The Jainas reply that it is not necessary for the atman to be vibhu for drawing the particles of the body, because if it is so, our body will be equal in extent to the whole universe, for our atman is all-pervasive. If we accept this argument that to draw the particles of the body, the soul must be all-pervasive, our body would be of a horribly vast size, because our soul will draw to itself all the particles of the universe.
The Naiyayika gives a further argument: If we believe that the soul is body-sized, as a consequence, it will be savayavu, i.e., having parts and therefore a karya (product), just like the body itself. The Jaina, however, is prepared to accept the logical consequence. More accurately he says that atman has pradesas, though not avayavas in an ordinary sense. He believes that ātman is savayava, is pariņāmin, and does change from time to time, for it is a substance having the qualities of origination, decay, and permanence. He does not believe in the absolute changelessness