Outlines of Jaina Philosophy

SR No.: 011084
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Mohanlal Mehta
Publisher: Jain Mission Society Bangalore
Publication Year: 1954
Total Pages: 195
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 7 MB

Page 79

XATURE OF SOU'L
otherwise. We say: "Devadatta sees with the eyes and lamp.”1 Here 'eye' and 'lamp' are both karanas, but on that account the two are not in the same position of absolute distinction with respect to Devadatta. Hence, jiāna is not absolutely distinct from ātman as an ordinary karana. It is identical with the soul, having different types of modifications ( paryāvas ).
Now, the opponent asks that if jñāna and ätman are one, how is their relation of karty and karana to be accounted for? The answer is given by the analogy of a serpent who makes a coil of his body by his own body. It may be said that the conception of karty and karaṇa in the case of the serpent is simply imaginary. How can it be said to be imaginary, when we actually see the effect, viz., the coil, which is a new state of rest different from the former state of motion ? o amount of imagination could make us believe that a pillar was going to wind itself into a coil.
Next, consider the word caitanya. It is the abstract noun from cetana which means cītman. Thus, caitanya means the bhūta, svarūpa, or nature of ātman. Now, how can the bhāva (nature) of a thing be absolutely distinct from the thing?
The opponent again argues that ātman is no doubt cetanī but that is not without a cause, but is owing to cetană coming to reside by samavāva relation in ātman as is shown by actual experience pratiti). The counter argument is in the following manner: If you are prepared to accept the evidence of pratiti, you must admit that ātman is by nature upayogātmaka, i.e., of the nature of conscionsness. Nobody is aware of being first acetana, and afterwards becoming cetana in consequence of the connection with cetanā, or of cetanā coming to reside by samavaya relation in him who was at first acetana. On the contrary, he is always aware of himself as the knower (jñātā.).
It may be further held that the consciousness 'rnatīnaham' (I have knowledge) would prove a distinction between jñāna (knowledge and aham (self), for the former is that which is possessed and the latter is that which possesses. This contention is also untenable. Who possesses the consciousness jñānatānaham' in the theory of the opponent? Not the soul, because it is
1 Dipena cakşusā Deradattah paśyati. 2 Sarpa ātmāna nātunanā iestuvati. - Syādvāda-manjari, p. 43.