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OUTLINES OF JAIXA PHILOSOPHY
cognition, so also it should be admitted that there is no separate faculty of intuition in one who has completely destroyed the relevant karmic veil. The contention that knowledge is determinate and distinct, whereas intuition is indeterminate and indistinct is true only in the case of an imperfect person. As regards a person who has destroyed all the relevant karmic obstructions, such distinction has no meaning. In his case, there is no distinction between determinate knowledge and indeterminate knowledge. The difference of distinct and indistinct, determinate and indeterminate, is true only in the case of the knowledge of imperfect beings, and not with regard to the knowledge of perfect ones. He further argues: If it is admitted that the omniscient intuits the unknown and knows the unintuited, the conception of all perfection would be ridiculous.3 According to the view of the successive occurrence of intuition and knowledge in the omniscient, a perfect person knows a fact that was not comprehended before, and intuits a feature of an object which was not cognised previously, since his cognition occurs in succession. In a different language, for the omniscient some aspect of an object remains unknown for ever. If such is the case, what is the charm in admitting omniscience? Furthermore, in the scriptures, omniscience has been described to have beginning but no end. Those who have any regard for the commandments of scripture must realise the significance of this fact. If it is held that at the time of perfect intuition, knowledge is not possible, and at the moment of perfect knowledge, intuition is an impossibility, it would mean to admit the break of continuity of both of them, but this is absurd, since it goes against the scriptures that prescribe non-break. If the destruction of intuition-obscuring karma and knowledge-obscuring karma takes place simultaneously, and the problem arises which of the two, perfect intuition and perfect knowledge, should spring forth first? Naturally, the priority cannot be given to any one of them. Nor is it proper to maintain the simultaneous occurrence of both,
1 Sanmati-tarka-prakaraņa, II, 6. ? ibid., II, 11. 3 ibid., II, 13. • Prajnapana-sutra, XVIII, 10. 3 Sanmati-tarka-prakarana, II, 7-8
| SR No. | 011084 |
| Book Title | Outlines of Jaina Philosophy |
| Original Sutra Author | N/A |
| Author | Mohanlal Mehta |
| Publisher | Jain Mission Society Bangalore |
| Publication Year | 1954 |
| Total Pages | 195 |
| Language | English |
| Classification | Book_English |
| File Size | 7 MB |