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INTRODUCTION.
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From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar, who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaisêshika. The Vaisêshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch ; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kanada, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view which is of the nature of a compromise between the Sânkbyas and the Vêdântins on the one hand and the Vaisêshika on the other. But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (1) both Gainism and Vaisêshika embrace the Kriyâvada, i. e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatkârya, i. e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Vêdânta and Sânkhya hold that they are the same (satkârya); (3) that they distinguish qualities from their substratum (dravya). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views ; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the primâ faciê con
See his Report for 1883-84, p. 101 f.
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