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existing in the same involves a contradiction. But this, we contend, is not borne out by facts of experience; nor is there any absolute law to the effect that identity should always and everywhere be destructive of difference. On the contrary, we have things with twofold aspects, just because it is thus that they are perceived. For, the same thing which exists as clay or gold, or man &c. at the same time exists as jar, diadem or Ram. And no man is able to distinguish in an object,-e.g. Jar or Ram,-placed before him, which part is clay and which the Jar or which part is the universal character of Ram and which the particular. Rather our thought finds its true expression in the following judgments, 'this Jar is clay' and 'Ram is a man'. Nor can it be maintained that a distinction is made between the cause and the universal as objects of the idea of persistence and the effect and the particular as objects of the notion of discontinuance— difference, in as much as, truly speaking, we have no perception of these two factors, in separation. However close we may look into a thing, we won't be able still
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Impossibility of rigidly distinguish.
ing between the Cause and the
Effect or the
Universal
and the
Particular.
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