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INTRODUCTION
OXIX
practical resulis to which it leads. But this harmony or agreement of knowledge with practical is not to the Jaina, as it is to the pragmatista the essence of truth. Trgth does not consist in, but only possesses the property of being praotically satisfactory."
Anekāntavāda and the theory of relativity-In the west there are two kinds of relativity: (a) idealistic as of Protagoras (B. C. 481?-B. C. 411), Berkeley (1685 A, D.-1753 A. D.) and Schiller and (b) realistic as of Whitehead (b. 1861 A. D.) and Boodin (b. 1869 A. D.). Anekāntavāda is a kind of relativism but it is realistic and not idealistio. “Our judgments about things are relative--but relative to or dependent upon not simply the mood of the judging mind, but upon the relational characters of the many-sided reality itself,"
Evalution-In “Notes” (p. 272) to SM Prof. Dhruva evaluates the doctrine of anekantavāda:
“The doctrine of it or w raak, as it otherwise called, is not a doctrine of mere speculative interest-one intended to solvo & mere ontological problem - but bas a bearing upon man's psychological and spiritual life. This is the point of Stanza XXVII in which the author show! how it is impossible to explain सुख-दुख्नु (भोग), पुण्य पाप and बन्ध-मोक्ष-except on the hypothesis of अनेकान्तवाद."
In the preface (p. XII) to SM he says:
"While the Vedāntin sees intellectual peace in the Absolute by transcending the antinomies of intellect, the Jaina finds it in the fact of the Relativity of Knowledge and the consequent revelation of the many sidedness of Reality--the one leading to religious mysticism, the other to intellectual toleration."
Thus this doctrine of anckūntavada helps us in cultivating the attitude of toleration towards the views of our adversaries. It does not stop there but takes us a step forward by making us investigate as to how and why they hold a different view and how the geeming contradictories can be reconciled to evolve harmony. It is thus an attempt towards syncretism.
One might say that this is mere common sense and that the principle is pre-supposed in every system of thought. It must however be remembered that the principle, if kept in the back ground, is always forgotten when needed most and that common sense, unfortunately, is a thing which is most uncommon. In Jainism this principle is kept in the forefront, and hence Jainism has attempted a rapprochment between the seemingly warring systems of philosophy.
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1 See An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (p. 98).