Ahimsa Crisis You Decide

SR No.: 007754
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Sulekh C Jain
Publisher: Prakrit Bharti Academy
Publication Year: 2016
Total Pages: 328
Language: English
Classification: Book_English, D000, & D005
File Size: 6 MB

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or leather is morally wrong as involving himsa inflicted on mobile, multi-sensed beings. Indeed, if this interpretation of anekantavada were even possible, it would make any assertion about ahimsa-from eating meat to human genocide-subject to a relativist interpretation. But the Sutras contain the wisdom of the Tirthankaras and, in Âkârânga Sûtra, it is written: "All breathing, existing, living sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away." That is clear; it does not admit of any relativist interpretation. Fourth, some argue that it is inconvenient to practice veganism. Convenience cannot be the touchstone. No Jain would think that considerations of convenience justified eating meat, poultry, or fish. If, as I and others maintain, dairy, eggs, and other animal products involve himsa inflicted on innocent mobile beings, then convenience can similarly not serve as a moral justification. But having said this, it is certainly no more inconvenient to be a vegan than it is to be a vegetarian. There are a variety of delicious non-dairy “milks" (soy, rice, and almond) available and these can be used for cooking and in beverages. There are delicious vegan "butters" made from soy that can substitute for ghee. The range of vegan clothing has increased dramatically in recent years and it is now easy to avoid the use of animal products for clothing.
Conclusion
The issue of veganism is not merely significant; it is crucial for Jainism. If Jains do not embrace veganism, then their rejection of eating animal meat is simply arbitrary. We cannot make a coherent distinction between meat, dairy, and leather in that all involve the intentional infliction of suffering and death on mobile, multi-sensed beings. To say that ahimsa prohibits one but not the other makes ahimsa meaningless as a normative principle because the principle would not even pertain to all situations that are substantially similar. That is, it is one thing if a moral principle covers situations x and y but a distinguishing feature makes situation z different from x and y in some relevant way and there is a question as to whether the moral principle still covers situation z. But if x, y, and z are all relevantly similar,
An Ahimsa Crisis: You Decide
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