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2.5 Evaluation of the Moral Worth of an Action
We have so far considered the criterion by which we are to determine what we morally ought to do in a given situation, how the rightness or wrongness of action is to be decided. But the question that remains to be discussed is: How the moral worth of an action is to be evaluated? How does, in Jaina terminology, an action become pu ya and p pa engendering? In other words, how does an act become virtuous or vicious, praiseworthy or blameworthy, morally good or bad?
1. It is likely that an act by the criterion of rightness may be externally right but internally immorally motivated. A man may seem to be doing things according to a moral rule, but it may be with a bad motive.
2. Again, an act by the standard of rightness may be externally wrong, but it may be done with a good motive. For example, one may kill the rich in order to serve the poor.
An act may be externally right and done with good motive.
An act may be externally wrong and done with a bad motive.
3.
4.
Thus there are four possibilities:
1.
2. Wrong act and good motive,
3.
Right act and good motive
4. Wrong act and bad motive.
Right act and bad motive,
The third and fourth category of acts according to Jaina ethics may be called ubha (auspicious) and A ubha (inauspicious) acts. The first category of acts (right act and bad motive) may look proper externally but its moral significance is zero. All deceptions are of this nature. The moral worth of the second category of acts (wrong act and good motive) is complicated and can be decided only on the nature of the case.
Though in Jaina ethical works, importance of good motive is recognised as contributing towards the moral merit of an action yet the Jaina c ryas have clearly stated that he who exclusively emphasised the internal at the expense of the external forgets the significance of outward behaviour. In consequence, both the internal and external aspects should occupy their due places. Ewing rightly observes, "They (good motives) lead us into evil courses on occasion if there is not at the back of our minds a moral consciousness which prevents this, so the strictly moral motive should always in a sense be present potentially." [8]
2.6 ubha (Good) and the ubha (the Good) to be distinguished
We have said above that according to Jaina ethics right, ought and duty cannot be separated from the good. Now the question that confronts us is: what is intrinsically desirable, good or worthwhile in life according to Jaina ethics? What intrinsic values are to be pursued according to it? The answer that may be given is this: What is intrinsically good and valuable or what ought to be chosen for its own sake is the achievement of 'Ahi s of all living beings', the attainment of knowledge etc.
But the basic question that remains to be discussed is the definition of good or ubha. The question 'what is good?' is different from the question, as Moore says, 'what is the good?' i.e. what things are good? In order to understand 'the good' or the ubha the first step is to understand, what is good or what is ubha?
2.7 Definition of ubha in Ethics and of Dravya in Metaphysics
What, then, is good or ubha? How is ubha or good to be defined? According to the Jinist, ubha is an experience in tune with Ahi s. We can better understand the nature and importance of the question, 'What is good or ubha in the realm of ethics?' when we find that it is like the question, 'What is Dravya (substance) in the realm of metaphysics?'
The definition of Dravya given by the Jaina c ryas is: Dravya is that which is Sat[9] (being).' Here 'being' is used in a comprehensive sense*) and not in any particular sense**). But no particular thing can be apart from 'being'. Logically speaking, we may say that 'being' is the highest genus, whereas
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STUDY NOTES version 4.0