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Ācārya Akalanka has described the standpoints as the hidden intentions or presuppositions of inquirers, different points of view of persons searching for truth. He further states that a pramāna results in knowledge while a standpoint is only a view of the knower. Each viewer views a thing from a particular point. For the ascertainment of reality, the doctrine of standpoints (naya) is necessary, in addition to that of pramāņa. In other philosophical schools, it is asserted that reality is revealed and cognized only by the means of knowledge. According to the Jainas a thing has innumerable characteristics, and a pramāņa may reveal a thing as a whole, but not its all particular features. Thus the standpoints (nayas), by putting emphasis on one aspect or other, can help us to grasp reality in a complete and proper manner.
A Pramāna reveals the thing as a whole of (sakala-grahī) while a naya reveals only a portion of it (amśa-grahī). A naya is only a part of Pramāna. A pramāna is compared to an ocean, while nayas are like drops of ocean kept in different pitchers. A naya is defined as a particular opinion (abhiprāya) or a viewpoint (apekṣā) a viewpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints, and is, thereby, expressive of a partial truth about an object (vastu) as entertained by a knowing agent (jñāta). A naya is a particular viewpoint about an object or an event, there being many other viewpoints which do not enter into, or interfere with the particular viewpoint under discussion. Although the other viewpoints do not enter into the perspective of the particular viewpoint under discussion they constantly, as it were, attack its frontiers and await its reconciliation with them in the sphere of a fuller and more valid knowledge which is the sphere of pramāna.
2.4. Naya and Nayābhāsa If we took an object from multiple points of view, we can say that there are many kinds of naya because abject is composed of multiform characteristics, and one naya knows only one characteristic. Naya or incomplete judgment is only one of the qualities of that abject and leaves the rest untouched. This does not mean that one rejects all other qualities except one, while advocating naya. The point is that a particular naya (viewpoint) selects one of the infinite qualities not rejecting the other viewpoints (nayas). If only one particular naya is accepted and all other are rejected it becomes a fallacious standpoint, which is called Nayābhāsa.
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