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II ADHYÂYA, 3 PÂDA, 18.
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such as That art thou ' teach the soul to be of the nature of Brahman, it follows that the soul also is eternal. For if we reasoned in this style we should have to admit also that the Ether and the other elements are eternal, since texts such as 'in that all this has its Self' and 'all this indeed is Brahman 'intimate them also to be of the nature of Brahman. Hence the individual soul also originates no less than Ether and the rest.-To this the Sätra replies, Not the Self, on account of scriptural statement. The Self is not produced, since certain texts directly deny its origination ; cp. 'the intelligent one is not born nor does he die' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); “There are two unborn ones, one intelligent and strong, the other non-intelligent and weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9). And the eternity of the soul is learned from the same texts, cp. 'There is one eternal thinker,' &c. (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); Unborn, eternal, everlasting is that ancient one; he is not killed though the body is killed '(Ka. Up. 1, 2, 18).—For these reasons the soul is not produced.
But how then about the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is known -- There is no difficulty here, since the soul also is an effect; and since effect and cause are non-different. But this implies that the soul is an originated thing just like Ether and so on ! Not so, we reply. By a thing being an effect we mean its being due to a substance passing over into some other state; and from this point of view the soul also is an effect. There is, however, the difference, that the other condition' which is represented by the soul is of a different kind from that which constitutes non-sentient things, such as Ether and so on. The otherness' on which the soul depends consists in the contraction and expansion of intelligence; while the change on which the origination of Ether and so on depends is a change of essential nature. And change of the latter kind is what we deny of the soul. We have shown that there are three entities of distinct nature, viz. objects of fruition, enjoying subjects, and a Ruler ; that origination and so on which are characteristic of the objects do not belong to the subjects, and that the latter are eternal; that the characteristic qualities of the objects and
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