Satapatha Bramhana Part 05

SR No.: 007680
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Julius Eggeling
Publisher: Oxford
Publication Year: 1900
Total Pages: 2017
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 44 MB

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202
VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
and others. But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect 1—Just so; and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all-powerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in their subtle state for his body. Compare the texts. His high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things' (Subål. Up. VII).- This point (viz. as to the body of the highest Person) will be established under Sa. II, 1, 4. The present Satra declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the Pradhâna; the Sätra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is the Pârvapakshin right in maintaining that the Khandogya passage is of the nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu—which is the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of the lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible that all things should be known through one thing-as maintained in the passage through which that is heard which was not heard,' &c.,--that this is possible after all. And the mention made in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth an Inference.
Let us assume, then, the Parvapakshin resumes, that the 'seeing' of the text denotes not seeing' in its primary, direct sense—such as belongs to intelligent beings only; but seeing' in a secondary, figurative sense which there is ascribed to the Pradhana in the same way as in passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water
the fire saw'; 'the water saw' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non-existent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is quite common; as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'; 'the rain delighted the seeds.'-This view is set aside by the next Satra.
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