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818
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIX.
TEXT (1674).
IT IS THE form (aspect) of the Thing itself THAT IS HELD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED '; IT IS IN THAT SAME FORM THAT IT EXISTS, AND
IT IS IN THIS FORM THAT IT IS PERCEIVED.-(1674)
COMMENTARY
When the thing is differentiated' from another thing, it is not in any other form ; in fact it is differentiated in its own form ; hence it is the form of the thing itself which is apprehended as differentiated from the other thing; as it remains in its own form. That form in which it is differentiated, in that form, the Thing is always existent, never non-existent. This thing is perceived in the form in which it is differentiated from other things; so that there is no apprehension of any second form or aspect of that thing.-(1674)
It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception; the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference
TEXTS (1675-1677).
WHAT IS CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVE ACTION IS SAID TO BE EXISTENT', -
OTHER THAN THAT IS SAID TO BE ' NON-EXISTENT'; THE TWO CANNOT EXIST TOGETHER IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM, AS THEY ARE CONTRADICTORY " BUT THE SAME THING MAY BE capable OF THAT DIFECTIVE ACTION WHICH IT CAN ITSELF ACCOMPLISH, BUT INCAPABLE OF ANOTHER (EFFECTIVE ACTION)".-IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE DUAL CHARACTER CAN NEVER SUBSIST IN ANY SINGLE THING. IF IT IS SOMETHING ELSE THAT IS REGARDED AS 'INCAPABLE OF THE OTHER ACTION, THEN THERE ARE TWO THINGS; AND THE DUAL CHARACTER DOES NOT BELONG TO ONE AND THE SAME THING.(1675-1677)
COMMENTARY.
(A) That which is capable of effective action is existent', for example that aspect of the thing which is regarded as existent'-and what is held to be 'non-existent is not capable of effective action ;-hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing.-o.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold,--the existent and nonexistent aspects are mutually contradictory :-so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.
The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is 'inad. missible'-" The same thing, etc. etc. That is to say, one and the same thing is capable of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself,