Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 799

1524
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
And as this cognition is clear and distinct, and is free from conceptual content, and is in conformity with the real state of things,-it fulfills all the conditions of "Perception', and hence it becomes established that it is Perception-(3475-3476)
Not accepting this view (that the Lord has the direct Perception of all things), the Author asserts the following, in answer to what the other party has asserted under Text 3175 to the effect that-"He alone sees things who sees them through the eternal Word".
TEXT (3477).
THE WISE MEN HAVE DECLARED THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAGE OF SUPERSENSUOUS THINGS PROCEEDS FROM THE INFERENCE STATED BEFORE. NOT FROM ANY REVEALED
WORD.-(3477)
COMMENTARY
The wise men-i.e. the Buddhists-have declared that the knowledge of supersensuous things, belonging to the Blessed Lord, which directly envisages all things, is brought about by the force of his meditations,—through the aforementioned Inference, independently of the Revealed Word; and that it does not proceed from any scriptures compiled by men. Hence as this view is not accepted by us, the objection does not affect us.-(3477)
It has been argued, under Text 3178, that "the beginninglessness that is asserted in regard to the composer and the utterances emanating from him is itself based upon two invalid notions, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (3478-3479).
BEGINNINGLESSNESS IS NOT ASSERTED IN REGARD TO THE COMPOSER OR TO THE UTTERANCES EMANATING FROM HIM,-FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THEIR VALIDITY; BECAUSE BEGINNINGLESSNESS BELONGS TO THE INVALID (WRONG) COGNITION ALSO; FOR INSTANCE, THE UNBELIEVERS AND THEIR WORDS,-AS ALSO THE VEDAS AND THEIR EXPOUNDERS -- ARE NOT VALID AND RELIABLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE
BEGINNINGLESS.-(3478-3479)
COMMENTARY.
When we assert Beginninglessness, it is not as a reason for reliability; because such a reason, as present in the absence of the Probandum also,