Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

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1490
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXVI.
Question :-"Why is it that Omniscience has not come into existence on the presence of a Cause?” Answer:
TEXT (3357).
BEING featureless AND Uncognised EVEN BY ITSELF, IT CAN NEVER COME INTO EXISTENCE. THUS IT WOULD MEAN THAT BEFORE ITS APPEARANCE, THE Omniscience ACTUALLY EXISTED (ANI WAS NOT BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE BY ANY
CAUSE).-(3357)
COMMENTARY. If you hold the view that “Omniscience disappears on the appearance of the character of being an entity' and 'cognisability,”-then, in that case, it would mean that, before the appearance of the character of being an entity', etc. the Omniscience was not an entity and was not cognisable' even by itself; and thus, (a) being a non-entity, it would be featureless, and (b) being incognisable, there would be no self-cognition of it; which means that the Omniscience is never brought about, and does not exist at all; how then can it be said to have appeared previously and then ceased ? Certainly there can be no appearance, coming into existence, of what is feature. le88. Nor can there be any basis for the existence of what is not cognised ; as all notions of the existence of things are dependent upon their being cognised. What is meant by all this is that the reasoning of the Opponent involves self-contradiction.
Then again, if its previous appearance is admitted, then this appearance itself, without any effort on our part, establishes the existence of Omni. science; hence it cannot be right to deny it; otherwise there would be selfcontradiction.-This is what is pointed out in the Text, by the words* Before its appearance, etc. etc.' ;-i.e. if it is admitted that the Omniscience existed before the appearance.-(3357)
It might be argued that "It may be that Incognisability and the rest are not incompatible with Omniscience: even so they indicate the nonexistence of the Omniscient Person."
The answer to this is as follows :
TEXT (3358).
THE AFFIRMATION OF WHAT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE CANNOT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS SETTING ASIDE THE OTHER. OTHERWISE THE PRESENCE OF COLOUR MIGHT MEAN THE ABSENCE
OF TASTE.-(3358)
COMMENTARY. Some people argue as follows :-"Even though Cognisability, etc. are not incompatible with Omniscience, yet the character of being