Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 649

1374
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
It has been argued under Text 2908, that "If the validity of the Cognition that proves the validity of another Cognition bo not proved by any other Cognition,--then the same might be the case with those whose validity is held to be proved by others”.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3094).
IN SOME CASES, THE MISTAKE OR ILLUSION THAT ARISES FROM THE VARIOUS CAUSES OF ILLUSION IS SET ASIDE BY ANOTHER COGNITION ; BECAUSE THERE IS NO CERTAINTY IN SUCH A CASE.
-(3094)
COMMENTARY. In some cases, it so happens that there being no means, in the shape of repeated Cognition, of securing certainty, some sort of illusion or mistake comes in; hence the validity cannot rest in the Cognition itself.-(3094)
It has been asserted, under Text 2910, that "Before the Cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form, and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient, etc. eto.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (3095).
THERE CAN BE NO MANIFESTED THING' UNTIL ITS MANIFESTATION HAS BECOME MANIFESTED; HENCE IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT THE COGNITION ITSELF IS ACTUALLY COGNISED, JUST LIKE THE
SENSE-PERCEPTION IN OTHER PERSONS.-(3095)
COMMENTARY.
Avyakta, etc.'-The compound means that thing of which the manifestation has not become manifested'.
The Cognition must itself be cognised. If it were not cognised, then there would be the contingency of the absence of Cognition of all things. Because what is spoken of as Cognition of a thing is only its manifestation -nothing else if this manifestation then were imperceptible, the thing itself would be imperceptible ; just as the object envisaged by another man's Cognition is not perceived by one, because its manifestation is not mani. fested to the latter.
The argument may be formulated as follows - When to a certain person the manifestation of a thing has not become manifested, that thing cannot be perceptible to him ;e.g. the object envisaged by the perception appearing in another man ;-the Oognition in question is one of which the manifestation