Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 608

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1333
and in such cases, the Validity is ascertained only extraneously, through the cognition of the resultant activity; and what is desired by the man having been secured by this, there is no need for further corroboration by another corroborative cognition; as there is in the case of the initial cognition. (2970-2072)
It has been argued by the Mimamsaka, under Text 2855, that "if the Validity of some cognition be held to be self-sufficient, why should there be hostility to the same being the case with the initial cognition ? "
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (2973). OF THE SECOND COGNITION, THE VALIDITY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT, BECAUSE THERE ARE NO CAUSES FOR MISAPPREHENSION; IN THE CASE OF THE FIRST COGNITION, HOWEVER, THERE IS HOSTILITY TOWARDS ITS SELF-VALIDITY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MISAPPREHENSION.
-(2973)
COMMENTARY.
Says the Opponent: "That cognition-which is concomitant with the suspicion of invalidity, and hence in regard to which there is no certainty regarding its capacity to get at its objective-would be like Inference and hence not valid. Because, in the case of Inference, when there is doubt regarding the invariable concomitance of the objective, no validity attaches to it; in the same manner Perceptions also would be not valid".
This does not affect our position. Because when Perception is regarded as valid, it is not because it represents itself as invariably concomitant with its objective, like Inference ;-but only as tending to the envisaging (or ideating) of the objective. Because it is called 'valid', when it presents the desired object to the man seeking for offective action; and this presentation of the object is not done either by carrying the man to the place where the object lies, or by carrying the object to the place where the man is; it is done by prompting the man to activity. Nor does it prompt the man to activity by taking hold of his hand; it does it by showing the objective of that activity ;-and this showing of the objective is nothing but the cognition of the object figuring in the Perception.-In a case where there is doubt, there also there certainly is cognition of the object figuring in the Perception; if there were no cognition of it, it could not figure in the doubt at all. As the functioning of the Perception would be complete by this much,-if there is a doubt later on, rogarding the invariable concomitance of the object (with the Perception),--this doubt could not prevent the functioning of the Perception; so that even when there is this doubt, the validity of the Perception remains intact.-That Perception, however, which appears as besot by the idea of a form contrary to the object figuring in the Perception, is not valid ; e.g. the Perception of the Mirage besot by the idea of Water; and the reason
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