Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 604

EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF 'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1329
It is for these reasons that the validity of the first cognition is said to be due to something extraneous to itself.-(2959-2962)
In the following Texts, the author sets forth another way of avoiding the Infinite Regress
TEXTS (2963–2965). IF THE INITIAL COGNITION DID NOT ENVISAGE A REAL ENTITY, THEN THE
SECOND COGNITION, IN THE FORM OF CONFIRMATION BY CONFORMITY TO THE REAL STATE OF THE THING, WOULD NOT APPEAR AT ALL; AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE THERE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN A MAN HAS THE COGNITION OF FIRE IN REFERENCE TO THE CLUSTER OF ASHOKA-BLOSSOMS, THERE DOES NOT APPEAR THE COGNITION ENVISAGING BURNING AND COOKING (WHICH ARE NOT BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED AS FIRE). IF THIS LATTER DOES APPEAR, THEN THE COGNISED OBJECT TURNS OUT TO BE NOT ANYTHING DIFFERENT FROM FIRE; BECAUSE FIRE IS ONLY AN ENTITY THAT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CAPACITY FOR PRODUCING ITS EFFECT (IN THE SHAPE OF burning, cooking AND THE REST).-(29632965)
COMMENTARY. If the initial-first-cognition had appeared in regard to a nonentity, then the subsequent cognition of its result in the shape of effective activity) could not come about ; because its cause would not be there; because the cognition of effective action is always concomitant with an entity. When the cognition does not envisage real Fire-when for instance one has the idea of Fire in regard to the bunch of Ashoka-blossoms,-there do not appear the cognitions of such actions as burning and cooking (which are peculiar to Fire).
If such cognitions did appear, then the thing cognised would really be Fire itself ;-why 1-because Fire is nothing else but what is characterised by the capacity to burn and to cook things.
Vibhāvasu' is Fire.—(2963-2965)
The argument is summed up in the following:
TEXT (2966). FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT SO LONG AS THE COGNITION ENVISAGING EFFECTIVE ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR, THERE IS ALWAYS A SUSPICION OF THE INITIAL COGNITION BEING WRONG (INVALID); BECAUSE OF THE CAUSES OF MIS
APPREHENSION.-(2966)
COMMENTARY. Says the Opponent :-"Like the initial cognition, the cognition of effective action also is produced directly by the thing, Fire, itself ;-then