Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 579

1304
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
This has been thus asserted in the Bhäsya (Shabara)— Hence the Veda is authoritative and reliable, because it is not dependent upon anything else; such being the case, there can be no need for another cognition or another Person ; because the Veda is self-sufficient in its validity' (Sa. 1. l. 5). (2895-2896)
Then again, is it meant that the Veda operates upon things apprehended by other Means of Cognition ? Or is it not so meant ? These are the two alternativos possible. If it is the second view that is accepted that the Veda is not operative on things apprehended by other Means, then that fact alone proves the self-sufficient validity of the Veda.-This is what is pointed out in the following:
TEXT (2897).
" THE FACT THAT OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION NEVER HAVE ANY BEARING
UPON WHAT IS SAID IN THE VEDA ESTABLISHES ITS VALIDITY.* OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE MERELY REITERATIVE."
-(2897)
COMMENTARY.
What is said in the Veda':-.g. that Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra', and so forth.
Other means of cognition ' Means of Cognition other than the Veda' are Sense-perception and the rest ;-the 'bearing of these consists in their having these same for their objective ;-and this bearing' is absent.
The fact -.e. the fact that they have no bearing. Asya'-of the Veda.
If the other alternative view is accepted, that the Veda envisages only those things that are apprehended by the other Means of Cognition, then, one cognition (that produced by the Veda or that produced by other Means) would be apprehending what has been already apprehended by other Means; consequently the later of the two would become invalid. This is what is pointed out by the words. Otherwise, etc. etc. '; -- otherwise', - i.e. if it is held that the Veda as a means of Cognition is operative on what is also apprehended by other Means of Cognition, then,-as it would be envisaging only what has been already apprehended by other means, it would be as invalid as Remembrance.
Thus what is itself a valid Cognition cannot need the corroboration of other cognitions ; hence it becomes established that all Cognitions are self. sufficient in their validity.-(2897)
The same idea is further elucidated