________________
1292
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXV.
TEXT (2855). "IF IN THE CASE OF SOME ONE COGNITION, THE VALIDITY IS ADMITTED TO BE INHERENT AND SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE SELF-VALIDITY
OF THE FIRST COGNITION ITSELF?"-(2855)
COMMENTARY Under the second view also (that the extraneous validity is due to the recognition of the perfect character of the Cause] there would be Infinite Regress. This is pointed out in the following:
TEXTS (2856-2857). "IF THEN THE VALIDITY OF SENSE-PERCEPTION AND OTHER COGNITIONS WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE PERFECT CHARACTER (OF THEIR CAUSES),
THESE PERFECTIONS THEMSELVES COULD NEVER BE THERE WITHOUT COGNITIONS ; HENCE ONE SEEKING FOR THIS OTHER COGNITION APPREHENDING THE PERFECTION OF THE CAUSE WOULD REQUIRE YET ANOTHER COGNITION APPREHENDING THE PERFEOTION OF THIS
LAST, AND SO ON AND ON."—(2856-2857)
COMMENTARY Dependent upon, etc. --.e. dependent upon the recognition of the perfect character of its cause.
Validity'-i.e. certainty regarding its validity.
Could never be there'-i.e. could not become fit for being regarded as being there.
Tasyāpi' of the cognition apprehending the perfection.
Anyaparichchhinna, etc. etc.'-.. the validity would be dependent upon the certainty of the perfection apprehended by another cognition. (2856-2857)
An instance is cited in support of the above
TEXTS (2858-2860). "JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE INITIAL COGNITION, SO IN THAT OF THE
OTHER ALSO, THERE WOULD BE INFINITE REGRESS, AS BEFORE ; AND SEEKING FOR THEM ONE AFTER THE OTHER, WE COULD NOT SEOTRE A BESTING GROUND.-IN CASE THE COGNITION OF THE PERFECTION IS NOT HELD TO BE ONE THAT HAS ITS VALIDITY DEPENDENT UPON THE PRESENCE OF THOSE PERFECTIONS IN ITS CAUSE, THEN THE INITIAL COGNITION OF THE OBJECT ALSO SHOULD NOT NEED THE VALID COGNITION OF PERFECTION IN ITS CAUSE.THUS THEN, EVEN GOING ALONG TO A LONG DISTANCE, IF ONE HAS TO ADMIT,