Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 56

OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
781
TEXT (1581).
NOTIONS OF CONNECTION WITH NAMES ARE PRODUCED BY ENDLESS MEANS, EVEN APART FROM SIMILARITY; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF SUCH NAMES AS 'Narapa' (KING) AND THE
LIKE.-(1581)
COMMENTARY
Notions, etc. etc. -i.o. notions of the relation of Names. • As in the case, etc. etc.'-i.. of 'King' and such names
(1581)
An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means -
TEXTS (1582-1583).
THAT PERSON IS THE King WHO IS PROTECTED FROM THE RAYS OF THE SUN BY THE WHITE UMBRELLA ', -HAVING BEEN TOLD THUS, THE MAN, LATER ON, SEES SUCH A PERSON-AND THROUGH THE SAID ADVICE, COMES TO HAVE THE NOTION THAT THIS IS THE PERSON BEARING THE NAME King':-Now THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT YORM OF VALID COGNITION, AS IT HAS NOT BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY SIMILARITY OR ANY SUCH CONDITIONS (AS BRING ABOUT OTHER FORMS OF COGNITION).
(1582-1583)
COMMENTARY
Someone says to another man-Brother, please go for this business, and see the King passing along with many persons riding elephants and horses ', -The other man says-Which one among them is the King ?' The first man replies- Among them, that person is the King who is protected from the Sun's rays by the white Umbrella ',--Bearing this instruction in his mind, the man goes forward, and when he sees such a person as described to him, there appears in his mind the idea that this is the person named King'.--Now, according to you (Naiyāyika)--this also would have to be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition--why ?-Because it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions. This shows that the said notion is not included under the six well-known forms of Valid Cognition.-(1582-1583)
Aviddhakarna notices the viow that "there are only two Means (or Forms) of Cognition ; and there is no object of Cognition apart from Specific Individuality and Commonalty (or the Universal)" ;-and in refutation of this view, ho puts forward the following arguments :-“(a) Perception has its companion