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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINI OY'SELF-SUFFICIENT VALIDITY'. 1279
The following might be urged"It may be that no Capacity can be imposed upon an indivisible thing subsequently; why ornnot it be imposed upon whnt is divisible ? Anster:
TEXT (2830).
DIFFERENCE' AMONG THINGS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED AS CONSISTING IN THEIR BEING ASSOCTATED WITH CONTRARY (DIVERGENT) PROPERTIES; SO THAT, IF ON THE appearance OF THE COGNITION, THERE IS non-appearance OF THE CAPACITY,THE SAID CONTRARY PROPERTY IS CLEARLY PRESENT IN THE
CAPACITY.-(2830)
COMMENTARY. The following Text proceeds to point out the objection that is specially applicable when thinga nre impermanent :
TEXTS (2831-2832).
WITH REFERENCE TO ALL THINGS, IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT THERE IS PERPETUAL FLUX'; HENCE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY EFFICIENT CAUSAL FACTOR TO IMPOSE A CAPACITY UPON THINGS.-SUCH THINGS HAVE NO SUBSEQUENT EXISTENCE, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THEY COULD ACQUIRE A CAPACITY FROM OTHER CAUSES, FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT
OF ANY EFFEOT.-(2831-2832)
COMMENTARY.. . For the bringing, etc. etc. 'such as the definite cognition of things. The rest is easily understood.-(2831-2832)
The following might be urged"If you have no dispute with us, then, why have you accepted the view that the validity of Pramānas is extraneous ?" Answer
TEXT (2833).
ALL THAT THE WISE BUDDHISTS ASSERT IS ONLY THIS THOUGH PRESENT IN A CERTAIN COGNITION, THE CAPACITY CANNOT BE APPREHENDED BY
ITSELF.-(2833)
COMMENTARY.
* Apprehended'-with certainty.
By itself'-i.e. by the mere presence of the Cognition-by the mere apprehension of things,-irrespectively of the subsequent conformity of its effects.-(2833)