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1242
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIV.
an Injunction if that is the Subject, then the Probans is one that cannot be admitted by the other party--(2740-2742)
It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2315, that "If by non-eternality is meant amenability to absolute destruction, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows
TEXT (2743)
ETERNALITY' CONSISTS IN continuing in the same condition ; AND THE OPPOSITE OF THIS IS NON-ETERNALITY'. IF THE continuing in the same condition OEASES, WHAT IS LEFT THERE THAT COULD
BE HELD TO BE 'EXTANT ?-(2743)
COMMENTARY.
What is left, etc. etc. The condition is not anything different from the entity to which it belongs; hence when the condition has ceased, the entity also, as a consequence, ceases. Otherwise, if one thing does not share the fate of another, it cannot be right to say that it is of the same nature as the other.(2743)
It has been argued by the Mimāmsaka, under Text 2744, that "If the Reason that is put forward is only amenability to sense-organs, then it is clearly fallacious, eto, etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (2744).
IF THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS ONLY amenability to sense-organs, IT IS CERTAINLY NOT RECOGNISED AS FALLACIOUS, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE UNIVERSAL' WAS ALREADY
BEEN DISCARDED.-(2744)
COMMENTARY
* Already
under the chapter dealing with the Universal '.--(2744)
"If there is no 'fallaciousness', in view of the Universal ', - even so, having its negation suspected, the Reason would be Inconclusive", Anticipating this argument, the Author proceeds to point out the Invariable Concomitance of the Reason, amenability to sense-organs':
