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"THE REVEALED WORD."
1213
TEXT (2658).
INASMUCH AS THE CONVENTION THAT SERVES TO INDICATE THE MEANING IS DEPENDENT UPON MAN-THERE WOULD BE POSSIBILITY OF 'FALSITY' (MISTAKE) IN THE POTENCY, EVEN THOUGH
BORN OTHERWISE.—(2658)
COMMENTARY.
With the view that you may have a clear and correct conception of the meanings of words, you have discarded the agency of man in the matter of the Potency of words), regarding him as the source of confusion and mistake. -But when words used by certain persons become confounded regarding their exact signification,-then the Vedio scholars would have an equal Cognition of all those significations, and would they not themselves make a confusion among them? Specially as those people would not be coguisant of the truth. Thus then the Convention would be dependent upon the whims of men and who could restrain this whim whence it has begun to operate, in the case of men ignorant of the truth 1–Thus the Convention born of the unrestrained whim would itself be unrestrained and hostile : and being so, why should it avoid the wrong signification ?—(2658)
Taking for granted (for the sake of argument) that the Word has the Potency of expressing several meanings--the Author proceeds to point out another objection:
TEXTS (2659-2660).
A SINGLE WORD MAY HAVE THE POTENCY TO EXPRESS SEVERAL MEANINGS. EVEN SO, SUCH THINGS AS THE Agnihotra' AND THE LIKE, CANNOT ALL BE OF USE TO ALL MEN ; BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY MAY EXPRESS THINGS CONTRARY TO WHAT IS DESIRED BY A CERTAIN PERSON. HENCE YOUR ASSUMPTION OF AN ETERNAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORD AND ITS MEANING IS ENTIRELY FUTILE.
(2659-2660)
COMMENTARY. Even though words may have the capacity of expressing several meanings,—the things denoted by them are not capable of all effective actions ; as the causal efficiency of all things is restricted. If it were not so, then there would be nothing destructive or non-destructive.--Thus then, when one wishes to speak of something capable of accomplishing a particular fruitful act,--and proceeds to set about the Convention in connection with a Word which by its nature is capable of expressing things, he should set up only that Convention which would be conducive to the expression of only that particular thing which he desires to speak of;—but how could this be secured? Thus, there being a possibility of mistake, there is no