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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
TEXTS (1557-1558).
WHEN A LINE OY TREES AND SUCH THINGS ARE SEEN, WHAT IS ACTUALLY
PERCRIVED IS ONLY One TREE, AND YET SOME IDEA OF THE second TREE BEING THERE, THERE FOLLOWS THE DEFINITE COGNITION (IN REGARD TO THE FORMER TREE) THAT THIS IS THE first';AND THIS WILL HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS A DISTINCT FORM OF COGNITION; AS IT DOES NOT DEPEND UPON ANY ELEMENT OF
SIMILARITY' OR OTHER CONDITIONS (ATTENDANT UPON THE WELLKNOWN FORMS OF COGNITION).-IF IT IS DENIED IN THIS CASE, ON THE GROUND THAT IT APPREHENDS ONLY WHAT HAS BERN ALREADY APPRERENDED, THEN THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID IN REGARD TO ANALOGICAL COGNITIONS ALSO.-(1557-1558)
COMMENTARY.
. And such things '-is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.
As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees, -80 long as one sees one of the trees only, there is no such definite cognition as that this is the first tree'; when however, he notices the second tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that 'this is the first tree' and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the Mimāmsaka in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted). -Why 1-Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of Similarity or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be analogical cognition because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be Sense-perception because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be Inference ;-because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be Verbal Cognition because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be Presumption and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be Negation. Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration- This is prior to that, This is posterior to that This is larger than thal-This is shorter than that all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition, which is highly undesirable!
It might be urged that—"as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as Valid Cogni. tion", this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehendod, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.
The plural number in Analogical Cognitione' is in view of the fact that there are many such cognitions.(1557-1558)