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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
769
conceptual notions as certain parts of the cow's body; and similarity is not any distinct entity, apart from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions ; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all. Hence what happens is that on the perception of the Gavaya, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the Cow's body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past; and this cognition that arises is of the nature of Remembrance, and it is not a distinct cognition apprehending a distinct entity in the shape of Similarity. If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also,-as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there, why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the Gavaya, in the way as it does in regard to the Cow ? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of similarity being present in both cases.
"Otherwise', i.e. if the parts of the cow's body had not been seen repeatedly.
In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of Remembrance, this difficulty does not arise ; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before ; as the causes that bring about Remembrar ce are restricted in their scope.-(1547–1549)
The following might be urged—"Analogical Cognition may be of the nature of Remembrance ; but why should Remembrance itself not be regarded as a valid form of Cognition ?"
Answer
TEXT (1550).
REMEMBRANCE CANNOT BE A FORM OF VALID COGNITION, BECAUSE IT ENVISAGES WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN. HOW THEN COULD IT BE
REGARDED AS A DISTINCT FORM OF VALID COGNITION ?- (1550)
COMMENTARY.
* Iyam'-stands for Remembrance.-- (1550)
Taking for granted that Similarity is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the Mimāmsala, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid