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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE.
767
TEXTS (1543–1545).
AS THERE IS NO OBJEOT THAT COULD BE COGNISED BY THIS MEANS, IT
CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A Means of Cognition.- IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT—"THERE IS THE CONNECTION OF THE MANIFOLD COMMONALTY OF component parts, WHICH IS WHAT IS cognised".-BUT commonalty ITSELF HAVING BEEN REJECTED, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY mani. foldness IN REGARD TO IT? How TOO COULD THERE BE ANY
CONNECTION WITH SUCH MANIFOLD COMMONALTY'? [SAYS THE OPPONENT]—“THERE A MEANS OF COGNITION WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF SUCH commonalty, IN THE FORM OF THE INFERENCE THAT-COMMONALTY IS AN ENTITY AND IS APPREHENDED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, BECAUSE IT IS COGNISABLE AS SOMETHING OTHER THAN NEGATION --LIKE THE Unique ENTITY". THE ANSWER TO THIS FOLLOWS IN THE FOLLOWING Text 1545.]-(1543-1545)
COMMENTARY.
Analogy cannot be a Means of Cognition, because there is nothing that is cogmised by means of it, and hence it is like any Means other than the six (that are accepted by the Mimämsaka).
"But there is similarity, consisting in the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts, which is cognised by its means; hence the Reason adduced (by the Buddhist) is 'inadmissible '.**
It is not so ; in course of our examination of Commonalty (Universal), all commonalties have been rejected; how then can there be any 'mani. foldness of Commonalties'? Nor is connection of Commonalties possible. Hence our Reason cannot be said to be 'Inadmissible.
The following might be urged :-"There is a Means of Cognition which establishes the existence of the Commonalty. Hence your Reason remains inadmissible. The said Moans of Cognition is as follows-The Commonalty is an entity', -and 'it is apprehensible by Sense-perception', these are the two Propositions; the Reason (Premiss) is, because it is something cogni. sable, other than Negation'; that is to say, it is cognisable as something which has a character other than non-existence'; the unique entity is the Corroborative Instance; the specific Individuality of things is the *unique entity'."-(1543-1645)
The answer to the above argument is provided in the following