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764
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIX.
TEXT (1536).
“SIMILARITY HAVING BEEN APPREHENDED BY SENSE PERCEPTION,
AND THE COW HAVING BEEN REMEMBERED, THE TWO TOGETHER (L.E. THE COW QUALIFIED BY SIMILARITY) ARE NOT COGNIS.
ABLE BY ANY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION ; HENCE HEREIN LIES THE FUNCTIONING OF ANALOGY AS A MEANS OF
COGNITION."-(1536)
COMMENTARY.
Though the similarity has become cognised by Sense-perception, and the Cow also has been remembered, yet, the cognition of the Cow as qualified by the Similarity has not been cognised by any other Sense-perception or Remembrance. Hence in the bringing about of this Cognition lies the operation of Analogy as a Means of Cognition.-(1536)
An example is cited, to illustrate this :
TEXT (1537).
«FOR INSTANCE, IN THE CASE OF THE WELL-KNOWN INFERENCE OF FIRE FROM SMOKE) THOUGH THE PLACE IS PERCEIVED BY SENSEPERCEPTION, AND THE FIRE (IN THE KITCHEN) IS remembered, YET THE COGNITION OF THE TWO
TOGETHER (I.E. THE FIRE AND THE PLACE IN THE HILL), DOES NOT CEASE TO BE Inferential."
-(1537)
COMMENTARY.
For instance, when the Place, the Minor Termis directly perceived, and the Fire is cognised by Remembrance--yet, when the resultant Inference of the place as qualified by Fire appears, it does not lose its character of the Means of Cognition ; in fact it remains a Means of Right Cognition. The same should be the case with Analogical Cognition also.-(1537)
