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1106
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXIV.
TEXT (2362).
AFTER THAT THE VEDA'S CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT COGNITIONS WOULD CEASE ; CONSEQUENTLY THE VEDA COULD NOT BE ETERNAL. LE THE SAID CAPACITY CONTINUES TO EXIST, THEN THE SAME
COGNITIONS SHOULD APPEAR AGAIN.-(2362)
COMMENTARY.
That is to say, if, after having simultaneously produced all the Cogni. tions, the Voda loses the capacity to produce Cognitions, then, on account of the cessation of that capacity, which forms the very essence of the Vedu, the Veda itself becomes liable to cease to exist. If however, the Veda does not lose that capacity, then, later on, the same set of Cognitions should appear again. Hence, we conclude that no eternal thing can possess any capacity for effective action.-(2362)
In the following Text, the author puts forward a likely explanation to ineet the argument that when the efficient cause of a thing is present, that thing must appear':
TEXT (2363).
IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT-"THE VEDA STANDS IN NEED OF EXPLANATIONS, ETC., AND AS THESE EXPLANATIONS APPEAR IN SUCCESSION, THE COGNITIONS (BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE VEDA) ARE
HELD TO BE SUCCESSIVE ALSO."-(2363)
COMMENTARY. The 'ote.' is meant to include Conventions These '--stands for the explanations.-(2363)
This objection is answered in the following :
TEXT (2364).
IT CANNOT BE SO; WHEN IT IS EFFICIENT (AND HAS THE CAPACITY) WHAT SORT OF 'DEPENDENCE' COULD THERE BE? IF IT IS EFFI CIENT BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THAT ON WHICH IT IS DEPENDENT, ---WHAT HOPE, THEN, CAN YOU HAVE OF ITS
BEING elernal ?-(2364)
COMMENTARY.
It is only when something is inefficient by itself, that it needs the help of others in securing the required efficiency; when, however, a thing is quite