Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 258

EXTERNAL WORLD.'
983
TEXT (2076).
THE REMEMBRANCE THAT HAS BEEN CITED CERTAINLY APPERTAINS TO THE APPREHENDED OBJECT;ONLY ITS SPECIAL FEATURES ARE NOT CLEARLY REMEMBERED. THE REMEMBRANCE DOES NOT PERTAIN TO ANYTHING AS DISTINCT FROM EVERYTHING ELSE; BECAUSE REPEATED EXPERIENCE AND OTHER CONDI
TIONS CANNOT BE THERE.-(2076)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant to be asserted here is the fact that it cannot be admitted' that "there is no Remembrance of the Apprehended Object when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition ".
The following might be urged :-"If the Remembrance pertains to the Apprehended Object, then why should its special features not be remembered, -when as a matter of fact, one would naturally remember the object as differentiated from all other like and unlike things, exactly as it has been apprehended. Otherwise if it did not apprehend its difference from other things, how could it appertain to it? There would certainly be incongruities".
The answer to this is— The Remembrance does not pertain, etc. etc.What is meant is as follows - Conception has not the capacity to apprehend things exactly as they exist,--because it does not envisage a real entity; what happens is that, when there has been apprehension of a certain thing, -the subsequent Remembrance that appears appertains to only that aspect of the thing with reference to which there happen to be such predisposing causes as the man's being in need of the thing concerned and so forth; so that the Remembrance itself is always devoid of the object-element. What happens in reality is that it really manifests itself alone, and by imposing the objective character upon what is purely subjective, all Remembrance be. comes wrong (false); and when a certain Remembrance is relegated to a certain Object, it is only because of the conception, not because there is any real connection between the two. It is not true that the conception of the Apprehended Object is present in Remembrance ; and it appears in a form in which the special features of the Object are not conceived, because the varying grades of contact and repeated experience that would be necessary for such conception of the special features are absent. It is on this account (of the vague conception of the Object) that one Remembrance is distinguished from another.-(2076)
Question "How do you know that there is idea of the Apprehended Object involved in the Remembrance ?"
Answer: