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EXTERNAL WORLD.'
955
touch-apprehend-itself; as it is wholly taken up in the manifesting (appre. hending) of the object; and when it is engaged in one thing, it cannot operate over another thing, without abandoning the former."-(2013)
Anticipating an objection on the basis of the Lamp (which is selfillumined), Kumūrila states as follows:
TEXT (2014).
" OR, THE ILLUMINATIVE CHARACTER OF THE COGNITION MAY BE REGARDED AS CONSISTING IN ITS BEING THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT. AND AS THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF ITSELF, COGNITION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS ILLUMINATING IT. .
SELF."—[Shlokavārtika-Shūnyavāda, 185).—(2014)
COMMENTARY
The question arising- If the Cognition is not illuminative of itself, how can it be regarded as illuminative of the external object ? Kumārila offers the following answer :
TEXT (2015).
* AS IN THE CASE OF THE EYE, IT IS FOUND THAT, EVEN THOUGH IT IS ILLUMINATIVE, YET IT HAS ITS ILLUMINATIVENESS RESTRICTED TO COLOUR, ---SO IT WOULD BE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO."
[Shlokavārtika-Shanyavāda, 186].-(2015)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of the Eye and other organs, it is found that their illuminative. ness is restricted to certain definite things, like Colour and the rest,-even though the Eye, etc. are not illuminative of themselves; the same would be the case with Cognition also.-(2015)
The following might be urged (against Kumärila) : How is it that, abandoning its own self, which is more intimate to itself, the Cognition illumines only the external Object?'
The answer to this by Kumärila is as follows:
