________________
'EXTERNAL WORLD.'
951
TEXT (2004).
IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE COGNITION TO BE COGNISED, BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. THE OBJECT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN PRODUCED, IS NOT IN THE FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS : HOW THEN COULD
IT BE COGNISED ? -(2004)
COMMENTARY.
Having thus proved the self-cognition of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form) :
TEXTS (2005-2006).
UNDER THE VIEW THAT COGNITION ENVISAGES A FORM', THOUGH, IN REALITY, THERE IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO (THE COGNITION AND THE FORM ENVISAGED BY IT), YET, ON ACCOUNT OF THE REFLECTION HAVING THE SAME FORM AS WHAT IS REFLECTED, THERE MIGHT BECOGNITION (OF ONE BY THE OTHER) IN THE INDIRECT SENSE-BUT FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT REGARD THE COGNITION AS BEARING THE IMPRINT OF THE OBJECT,
- THERE CAN BE NO' COGNITION OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, EVEN IN THE SAID INDIRECT '
SENSE.—(2005-2006)
COMMENTARY.
Reflection i.e. of the form of the Cognition. Tādrüpyut'-on account of its having the same form. Indirect'--not primary ; secondary.
Even this '-cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.-(2005-2006)
The following might be urged "The sword strikes the Elephant, the Fire burns the inflammable thing; and yet the Sword and the Fire are not of the form of the Elephant and the inflammable thing in the same way the Cognition, though not assuming the form of the Object, would apprehend that object".
This is the view set forth in the following
