Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 217

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XXIII.
Says the Opponent-"The anaertion that things have two forms' is quite definite".
True, that nesertion is there ; but the assertion is not right. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (1984-1985)
HOW CAN IT BE RIGHT TO SAY THAT A single THING HAS two FORMS? IN FACT, THERE WOULD BE TWO THINGS, BACH DIFFERING FROM THE OTHER IN TORM. IF THEY WERE OF THE SAME FORM AS ONE ANOTHER, THE DUALITY OF FORMS WOULD BE ANNULLED ; AND IT WOULD BE THE Uncommon FORM THAT WOULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE EYE AND OTHER
SENSE-ORGANS.-(1984-1985)
COMMENTARY. For instance, if thero are two forms of a thing, different from one another, then there are two things; as the two forms, being different from one another, would be two different things; and it would not be right to say that a single thing has two forms.
Then again, the two forms, being not-different from the Thing itself, would be identical, both being like the form of a single thing; how then could it be a single thing having two forms ?
Further, as the Particular form of a thing is not entirely different from the Universal form, there would be a possibility of the former being apprehended by the senses ; and in that case there could not be the clear cut distinction that the Common form is amenable to Sense-cognition and the Uncommon form is amenable to mystic cognition':-(1984-1985)
Further, the assertion that one thing has two forms' involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1986—First Line).
How COULD ONE AND THE SAME THING HAVE TWO MUTUALLY
CONTRADICTORY FORMS (AND CHARACTERS) ?-(1986)
COMMENTARY.
The two forms-Common and Uncommon-are such that the absence of one implies the presence of the other and vice versa ; how then can any single thing have these two forms -(1986)
The following Text sets forth the view of Kumärila