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LOKĀYATA-MATERIALISM.
935
found to appear from experience during the present life and there is badhana' - denial-also of what is desired by the upholder of the other world'.
"(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes devoid of the Probandum ; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.
"(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes contradictory';as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives."-(19621963)
The above objection is answered in the following
TEXT (1964).
WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED IS THE GENERAL FACT. NOR WOULD THE REASON BE 'CONTRADICTORY '; THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THESE AND THE REASON, BY REASON OF WHICH INCOMPATIBILITY, IT COULD
NEGATIVE IT.-(1964)
COMMENTARY.
It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us. Nor is the Reason Contradictory. "Why?"
Because there is no incompatibility between being produced from past experience and 'Love and other feelings ',-by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of being due to past experience 'could be set aside.
Further, such notions as 'this world' and 'the other world' are based on differences in the state or condition of things, and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth.
In this way, the beginninglessness of things) becomes established. Hence this should not be emphasised-as it amounts to the view-point of other disputants (Naiyāyika, Mimāmsaka, etc.).-(1964)
End of Chapter on Materialism.