Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 185

910
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XXII.
Then again, the reductio ad absurdum that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Matorial Cause of the other, but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp; because it belongs to an entirely different 'Chain'.. Hence what has been urged is nothing at all.
Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother-.g. the sweat-born insects, how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series ? -We resist from further argumentation on this subject.
If, on the other hand, it be held that the Oognition of the other Chain is & contributory Cause of the First Cognition, then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.-(18931896)
The following Text formulates the argument in support of the beginning. lessness (of Cognition):
TEXT (1897).
THUS THEN THE FIRST COGNITION MUST BE REGARDED AS ARISING OUT OF ITS OWN MATERIAL CAUSE,BECAUSE IT IS Cognition AND SO FORTH,-LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE PRESENT
MOMENT.-(1897)
COMMENTARY.
The argument may be formulated as follows:That entity which partakes of the nature of the Four Phases of Cognition, Feeling, Name-Conception, and Mental Faculty, must be regarded as proceeding from its own Material Cause ;-because it is cognition, Feeling, etc. etc.-just like the same Four Phases during youth and old age ;-the First Cognition is of the nature of Cognition :-hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.
In the term 'First Cognition', the mention of Cognition is only by way of illustration; what is asserted should be understood to be true of Feeling and the other Phases also.-(1897)
The following Text puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion :
TEXT (1898).
As OTHER CAUSES HAVE BEEN REJECTED, IF THE COGNITION WERE ENTIRELY WITHOUT CAUSE, THEN, IT COULD NOT HAVE ANY
PARTICULAR CHARACTER AT ALL.-(1898)
COMMENTARY.
All other causes, in the shape of the eternal things--Mind, Time, Space, God and so forth, have been rejected before ; and the view that the Cognition arises out of itself is not accepted ; the only alternative left is that it should be without cause ; but in that case it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as Being Cognition and the like. Because a character