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EXAMINATION OF SYĀDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).
845
NOT BE TRUE THAT A SINGLE THING HAS SEVERAL ASPECTS. IF THE Blue, etc. THEMSELVES DO NOT CONSTITUTE 'ENTITY':--AND THIS IS LIKE THE BEING' (Sattva) POSITED BY 'Kanāda ', -THEN IT CANNOT BE AS YOU HOLD, THAT ONE THING CANNOT HAVE SEVERAL ASPECTS; AS THERE WOULD BE CLEAR DIFFERENCE.-FURTHER, WHAT CONSTITUTES DIFFERENCE' AMONG THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES, AND NO OTHER KIND OF DIFFERENCE' IS HELD TO LIE BETWEEN 'BLUE' AND 'YELLOW'. THIS SAME CONDITION IS PRESENT BETWEEN THE GENERAL' AND THE
PARTICULAR'; BECAUSE WHILE THE FORMER IS 'INCLUSIVE', THE LATTER IS OTHERWISE. WHY THEN SHOULD NOT 'DIFFERENCE BE ADMITTED AS CLEARLY LYING BETWEEN THEM?-(1738-1744)
COMMENTARY.
The 'Entity' is said to be that which is capable of effective action, nothing else.--If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. It is only in this sense that things are held to be productive. This capacity then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.
Further, is the 'Entity' the same as the Blue, the Yellow and other things? Or is it something different 1--If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the white and yellow could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the Blue.--Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things, and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.-If on the other hand, the entity' is something different from the Blue, etc.,-like the Being 'posited by Kanāda,
-i.e. just as Kanāda has postulated the 'Entity', called 'Being, as some. thing different (from the particular things),-then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute Plurality' to any single thing; as in this case there would be clear absolute difference.
Then again, any two things are different 'only when they have contrary poperties,-e.g. Hot and Cold ;-the General and the Particular are found to have contrary properties; because while the former is 'inclusive', the latter is otherwise ; otherwise i.e. not-inclusive, exclusive If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the Blue and the Yellow, which is admitted in some way, by the other party ;-Kumārita himself having declared (in Shlokavārtika-Sense Perception, 158) that—" as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same" ;-where it has been declared that there is difference among the Blue and other things.-- (1738-1744)
The author puts forward-from Kumārila's point of view the objection against the Buddhist argument, the objection that the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive':