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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XX.
other hand, when the identity between things is denied, they are said to be * diverse, different ': as in the case of Matter and Consciousness. As it is impossible for both affirmation and denial to pertain to any one thing, there is clear contradiction between Unity' and Plurality, which are based respectively upon the said identity and difference. Hence any diversity of properties of a single entity can be only a creation of fancy.-(1728-1729)
Question :- Why should there be contradiction between Identity and Difference (Affirmation and Denial) ?" Answer :
TEXT (1730).
AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY ; AND THEY CANNOT BE MADE BY ANY SANE-MINDED PERSON, IN REGARD
TO ONE AND THE SAME THING.(1730)
COMMENTARY. The following might be urged-"What is the basis of the assumption of the diversity of properties? There must be a distinct basis for it; otherwise there would be confusion among things. Hence it follows that that which would be that distinct basis would be the real diversity of properties for
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1731-1732).
WHEN AN ENTITY, EXCLUDED FROM SEVERAL LIKE AND UNLIKE THINGS, IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM this AND that, THAT IS CALLED THE DIVERSITY OF PROPERTIES'. IN THIS WAY EVEN A SINGLE THING MAY BE assumed TO HAVE NUMBERLESS DIVERS E FORMS; BUT IN reality, NO SINGLE THING CAN REASON
ABLY HAVE TWO FORMS.-(1731-1732)
COMMENTARY. The compound 'aajatiya, etc. etc.' is to be expounded as there is first a karmadhāraya compound between like and unlike' and several '; -and from these the entity is excluded': -When such a single entity is differentiated from this and that, -like and unlike thing—this is what forms the basis of the idea of the diversity of properties. Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed 'Plurality', -there can be no reason for postulating a real duality of form for any single thing.
The particle api implies that there would bo 'superfluity' in the Jaina writer's argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.-(1731-1732)
The following might be urged :-"The argument urged (by the Buddhist) is Inconclusive, in view of entities like Narasimha and others; though these