Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 112

EXAMINATION OF SYÄDVĀDA' (JAINA DOCTRINE).
837
TEXTS (1714-1716).
"IF IT WERE NOT AS ASSERTED, THEN, TO WHAT WOULD THIS FACT BE
DUE THAT THE COMMON NOTION OF 'ENTITY' DOES NOT APPEAR IN CONNECTION WITH THE Crow's TEETH, WHILE IT ALWAYS APPEARS AS RESTRICTED TO Entities ALONE ?-IF IT BE URGED THAT THE SAID RESTRICTION IS DUE TO similarity', THEN OUR ANSWER IS THAT, THAT SAME (SIMILARITY) IS WHAT WE CALL COMMONALTY':THIS SAME REMARK APPLIES ALSO TO THE VIEW THAT THE SAID RESTRICTION IS DUE TO A CERTAIN CAPACITY IN THE NATURE OF THINGS ',- Absolute difference (FROM OTHER ENTITIES) THEREFORE IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY ENTITY ; BECAUSE ENTITIES DO NOT DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER, ON THE POINT OF BEING 'ENTITIES'."-(1714
1716)
COMMENTARY.
If it were not, etc. etc. '-If an entity were not-equal' to different from every other entity--then how is it that the common idea of being an entity' is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the crow's teeth' (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained.
It might be urged that the basis for this lies in the similarity (among entities)'
Then it becomes established that that same Similarity is the Commonalty', the Common character ; similarity' being synonymous with Commonalty (Common character).
It might be explained that the said comprehensivó potency subsists in the Jar and other entities only, and not in the Crow's Teeth and such non-entities; hence the capacity of the nature of things is what forms the basis of the notion in question'.
This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained ; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding 'Similarity'; because the said capacity may be regarded as the required 'Commonalty'.
From all this it follows that, in the form of entities', all things-the Jar and the rest-are not different from one another.-(1714-1716)
The following Texts provide reasons for accepting the (particular character) of things from one another
difference'
TEXTS (1717-1719).
"IF THE SAID ENTITY WERE ENTIRELY DEVOID OF DISSIMILARITY FROM
THE OTHER STANDARD ENTITIES, THEN THAT ENTITY WOULD NOT BE DIFFERENT FROM THESE; THERE WOULD BE COMPLETE NONDIFFERENCE, -AS FROM THEIR OWN SELVES. WHAT IS CALLED *DISSIMILARITY' IS ONLY A FORM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE; HENCE