Tattva Sangraha Vol 2

SR No.: 007609
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1939
Total Pages: 887
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 84 MB

Page 109

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER XIX.
If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else, -(1) would it be produced through the intervention of something related to it? (2) of something not related to it? (3) would it envisage distinction ? or (4) envisage non-distinction - These four alternatives are possible. As an example of cognition envisaging distinction, there is the cognition of a particular Fire-produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through smoke in general. An example of cognition envisaging non-distinction, there is the cognition of mere Fire as excluded from other unlike things, produced by Smoke.—Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) not related to the thing concerned (Fire), there would be no restriction at all; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.-If the cognition envisage distinction, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor; and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive. -If then the cognition envisaged non-distinction, then it would be included under Inference'.
All this is what is urged in the TextIf, lastly, the Cognition, etc. etc.; and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc. ' That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things; e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke. If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly Inference, as brought about by the perception of Relation,-as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.-(1702-1708)
Ind of Chapter XIX.