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OTHER FORMS AND MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE
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of the absence of the Jar. It is for this reason that in all cases, the non-apprehension of the character of the thing leads to the thing being regarded as non-existent. In reality however what has to be perceived is the non-apprehension of the effect (which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the Cause) -(1688-1689)
The following Text proceeds to show the 'Inconclusive character of the Reason-because it is spoken of by the name Negation (therefore Negation should be regarded as different from Perception and the rest'; see Teat 1658) :
TEXT (1690). THUS, IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT NEGATION IS ESSENTIALLY A POSITIVE ENTITY, THE FACT OF ITS being spoken of by the name Negation is NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS BEING INCLUDED (UNDER OTHER
MEANS OR FORMS OF COGNITION).-(1690)
COMMENTARY. Thus',-.. under the principle that the perception of one thing is what is called the non-perception of other things and so forth.
The fact, etc. etc. -Even when Negation' is included under Perception', the fact of its being spoken of by the name Nogation does not become incompatible.
This shows that the Probans put forward by the Opponent is not absent where the contrary of the Probandum is present.-(1690)
TEXT (1691). As REGARDS THE CONTENTION (UNDER Text 1659) THAT “NEGATION MUST BE COGNISED BY A MEANS WHICH IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS ITSELT", THIS IS ENTIRELY SUPERFLUOUS; AS SVEN IN WHAT WE ASSERT THERE IS THAT
sameness of nature.-(1691)
COMMENTARY.
* There is that sameness of nature',--the 'non-apprehension', in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.
In this connection, some people urge the following objection "The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest, because it envisages only the absence (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things ;-nor can it be regarded as invalid, -as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the absence of things."