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The Sankara School of Vedānta
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The philosophical situation. A Review. Before dealing with the Vedānta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which determine the position of the Vedānta as taught by Śankara and his school.
The Sautrāntika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (purusārtha). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (samyagjñāna) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is concerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (arthaprăpakatva). The perception is right (abhrānta non-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by it (samvādakatva). That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagination. When I say "this is the cow I had seen," what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is called cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and permanence to objects perceived is called kalpanā or abhilāpa. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilāpa association (kalpanapodha), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name-the nirvikalpa-is thus what is perceived. As a result of the pratyaksa the manovijñāna or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an